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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Respondent INTERMOUNTAIN STOCK EXCHAnGE ("INTER.MOUNTAIN") 
regained possession of the basement of the Intermountain Stock 
Exchange Building in Salt Lake City after an unlawful detainer 
action, and UTE-CAL LAND DEVELOPMENT ("UTE-CAL") and PETER J. BUFFO 
("BUFFO") appealed. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Honorable James S. Sawaya, in the Third District Court 
of Salt Lake County, Utah, heard the case without a jury on 
March 6th and 7th, 1980. After service of a Notice to Quit 
on December 12, 1979, appellant BUFFO filed a declaratory 
judgment action on December 31, 1979 seeking to establish the 
existence of a lease. The lower court granted accelerated con-
sideration of respondent INTERMOUNTAIN's W1lawful detainer 
counterclaim. Judge Sawaya found that appellant BUFFO had neither 
assumed a prior, terminated lease for the same premises nor 
negotiated a new lease with respondent INTERMOUNTAIN. The 
Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment (Unlawful Detainer) held that appellant BUFFO's month-to-
month tenancy had been properly terminated when he was duly 
served with Notice to Quit under Utah's Unlawful Detainer 
Statutes, 78-36-1 through 78-36-11 U.C.A. 1953, as amended. 
The lower court granted respondent INTERMOUNTAIN immediate 
possession of the prett.ises and awarded the statutory treble 
damages for the period of appellant BUFFO's unlawful detainer 
from January 1, 1980, until appellant BUFFO vacated the 
prei , n.nl'\ 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant BUFFO filed a Notice of Appeal on May 5, 
1980, seeking a reversal of the April 3, 1980 Judgment that 
he was unlawfully detaining respondent INTERMOUNTAIN's premises 
after January 1, 1980. Appellant BUFFO does not seek repossession 
of the premises. Rather, appellant BUFFO hopes to overturn the 
award of statutory treble damages in the amount of $13,688.00 (R. 234) 
made to the respondent INTERMOUNTAIN by Judge Sawaya. 
If the lower court's determination of the unlawful 
detainer issues is upheld, appellant PETE J. BUFFO seeks dec-
laration from this Court that he is not personally liable for 
damages awarded and already paid. Alternatively, appellant 
BUFFO seeks reduction in the damages awarded by the trial court. 
Respondent INTERMOUNTAIN respectfully requests this 
Court to affirm the Judgment of the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Rule 75(p) (2) (d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
requires that the appellant•s brief contain "a concise statement 
of the material facts of the case citing the pages of the record 
supporting such statement." However, appellant does not once 
cite the Record in his Statement of Facts. 
The Statement of Facts in appellant BUFFO's Brie£ 
is controverted by respondent INTERMOUNTAIN with references 
to the pages of the Transcript on Appeal and the Exhibits. 
Appellant BUFFO has failed to refer to the lower court's Findings 
of Fact and supporting Transcript on Appeal and Exhibits 
-2- / 
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necessary for the resolution of this dispute. Although appel-
lant BUFFO's Brief attacks Judge Sawaya's Findings of Fact, 
there are no citations to the testimony at trial. Instead, 
there are inappropriate citations to the depositions of wit-
nesses who appeared at the two-day trial. such misstatements, 
omissions and detailed citations to BUFFO's deposition are 
puzzling, for appellant BUFFO apparently objects to only one 
aspect of the lower court's decision - the provision for treble 
damages. 
On August 1, 1976, INTERMOUNTAIN leased a portion 
of the basement of its Exchange Building, at 39 Exchange Place, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, to Investestate, Inc., ("INVESTESTATE"), 
a publicly held Utah corporation (R. 332, Defendant's Exhibit 
No. 1, R. 390-1). INVESTESTATE operated a private club on 
the premises (R. 332). 
The INVESTESTATE lease was to run for a period of 
two years - from August l, 1976, to July 31, 1978 (Defendant's 
Exhibit No. 1, Article II, Section 1). The lease specifically 
provided that INVESTESTATE could not assign the lease without 
"the express written consent of the Landlord (INTERMOUNTAIN)" 
(Defendant's Exhibit No. 1, Article VI, Section 4). The lease 
also provided that INVESTESTATE had an option to extend the 
initial term for an additional five-year term by giving written 
notice to INTERMOUNTAIN of its intent to do so at least six 
months prior to the expiration of the original term {Defendant's 
Exhibit No. 1, Article XVII). 
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INVESTESTATE was unable to operate profitably and 
was forced to breach its lease in 1977 (R. 441, also admitted 
by appellant BUFFO at Page 3 of Appellant's Brief). In October 
of 1977, INTERMOUNTAIN terminated INVESTESTATE's lease for 
failure to pay rent (Trial Court•s Findings of Fact No. 4; 
Defendant's Exhibit No. 2; R. 333; R. 392). INVESTESTATE was 
allowed to remain as a month-to-month tenant until it abandoned 
the premises in May of 1978. (Trial Court's Findings of Fact 
No. 4; R. 225-26; R. 334). As of the date of INVESTESTATE's 
abandonment, over $2,000 was past due as rent. (Defendant's 
Exhibit No. 2). This: amount· was: reduced to judgment against 
INVESTESTATE in November, 1978 (R. 395). That amount was never 
paid to the landlord INTERMOUNTAIN either by INVESTESTATE 
(R. 395) or by BUFFO (R. 348) though BUFFO admits he promised 
to pay that judgment amount (R. 464-465) • 
During the first week of June, 1978, appellant BUFFO ( 
took possession of the abandoned premises without the prior 
consent or knowledge of INTERMOUNTAIN. (Trial Court's Findings 
of Fact No. 6; R. 226; R. 335-336). Appellant BUFFO informed 
INTER.MOUNTAIN, through its President, Reo Cutler, that he, 
BUFFO, had taken over the premises from INVESTESTATE and that 
he wished to negotiate a lease agreement with INTERMOUNTAIN 
for the premises. (Trial Court's Findings of Fact No. 6; 
R. 226; R. 335-6). BUFFO stated expressly that "I told Mr. 
Cutler that in reference to the existing lease that was presently 
on the property, there was no use discussing it, because if 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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there was a problem on it, I was not going to buy a lawsuit" 
(R. 445). Reo Cutler, as President of INTERMOUNTAIN confirmed 
with BUFFO that a new lease would be necessary since the INVEST-
ESTATE lease had been terminated in October of 1977. (Trial 
court's Findings of Fact No. 7; R. 226; R. 335-6). correspon-
dence and proposed lease agreements were exchanged. (Trial 
Court's Findings of Fact Nos. 8, 9, and 11; R. 226-27; Defendant's 
Exhibits No. 3, 4 and 5). The essential terms proposed by 
each of the parties were in substantial conflict. (Defendant's 
Exhibit No. 8; Trial Court's Conclusion of Law No. 2; R. 228-29; 
R. 385-6; R. 400; R. 452). No agreement on the terms was ever 
reached and hence no lease was ever executed between INTERMOUNTAIN 
and UTE-CAL or BUFFO. (Trial Court's Findings of Fact No. 11; 
R. 227; Trial Court's Conclusion of Law No. 2; R. 228-29; R. 
339-341). 
Neither appellant BUFFO, UTE-CAL nor any other entity 
controlled by the felon PETE J. BUFFO made timely rent payments 
for the first three months BUFFO occupied the basement of the 
Intermountain Stock Exchange Building - June, July, and August 
of 1978. (Trial court's Findings of Fact No. 12; R. 227; R. 
477). When BUFFO finally sent a check for past due rent on. 
August 3, 1978, the check bounced. (R. 343). Following the return 
of BUFFO's rent check for insufficient funds, Reo Cutler, the 
President of INTERMOUNTAIN, had a telephone conversation with 
• Buffo. (R. 332; 343). During this telephone conversation, 
• cutler told "Mr. Buffo in August of 1978 that there would 
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be no further negotiation regarding the lease." (R. 344). 
This conversation implemented the decision of the Board of 
Trustees of INTERMOUNTAIN that they " ••• were just not in-
terested in discussing the lease further until we (INTERMOUNTAIN) 
found out whether he (BUFFO) was going to pay his bills." (R. 
344). 
The brother-in-law of PETE J. BUFFO, Dr. Silvio Fasio, 
who originally introduced BUFFO to INTERMOUNTAIN, was a member 
of the Board of Governors of the Intermountain Stock Exchange 
when this decision to terminate lease negotiations was taken. 
(R. 487-8). 
During the next nine months, BUFFO defaulted repeatedly 
on the rental payments due INTERMOUNTAIN on the month-to-month 
tenancy. (Defendant's Exhibit No. 6). BUFFO was served with 
a Notice to Quit or Pay Rent on three separate occasions. (Trial 
Court's Findings of Fact No. 14; R. 228; Defendant's Exhibits 
22, 23 and 24). BUFFO admits receipt of these notices pursuant 
to the Unlawful Detainer Statutes. (R. 462; 471). 
In August, 1979, INTERMOUNTAIN accepted an offer from 
co-respondent Exchange Associates to purchase the Intermountain 
Stock Exchange Building. (Findings of Fact No. 15; R. 228). 
The purchase was completed on October 15, 1979. (R. 372). 
After the purchase, Exchange Associates attempted to negotiate 
a lease of the basement premises with BUFFO and UTE-CAL. (Find-
ings of Fact No. 15; R. 228; R. 372-376). Like INTERMOUNTAIN, 
Exchange Associates were unable to agree upon terms with BUFFO. 
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(Findings of Fact No. 15; R. 228; R. 377). Draft leases were 
prepared by Exchange Associates but never signed or accepted 
by BUFFO. (R. 376-7). 
Exchange Associates served a Notice to Quit the 
premises on December 12, 1979. (Findings of Fact No. 16; R. 228; 
R. 378; R. 482). The December 11, 1979 Notice to Quit was 
served by Deputy Constable R. J. Reitz (Defendant's Exhibit No. 
20). The Notice was personally delivered to the Manager of the 
private club BUFFO operated in the basement of the Intermountain 
Stock Exchange Building. (R. 482; Defendant's Exhibit No. 20). 
A copy was posted in the door of the premises. (R. 482; Defendant's 
Exhibit No. 20). A copy was mailed to BUFFO. (Defendant's 
Exhibit No. 20). A copy was delivered to counsel to BUFFO, 
Robert M. McRae and Loni F. DeLand, who had accepted notice 
before, apparently on behalf of BUFFO. (R. 482). 
I. APPELLANT BUFFO'S NOTICE OF APPEAL FROM THE 
UNLAWFUL DETAINER JUDGMENT WAS NOT FILED 
WITHIN TEN DAYS, AS REQUIRED BY 78-36-11, 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED. 
The jurisdictional question presented in this case 
is whether Notice of Appeal filed on May 5, 1980, challenging 
an unlawful detainer judgment entered on April 3, 1980, was 
timely filed. If the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, 
this Court should dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 
on June 30, 1980, respondent INTERMOUNTAIN raised this 
jurisdiction question by filing a Motion to Dismiss the Appeal 
pursuant to Rule 73B(a) (1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. On 
August 11, 1980, this Court deferred its ruling on the Motion and 
directed the parties to address the question in their briefs. Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Respondent INTERMOUNTAIN's position is: On April 3, 
1980, Judge Sawaya signed the Judgment entitled "Unlawful De-
tainer." (R. 233). The Judgment was entered later that day, 
April 3, 1980. (R. 233). On April 11, 1980, appellant BUFFO 
filed an "Objection to Judgment." (R. 238). Such a pleading 
is not authorized by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This 
Court has held that such unauthorized pleadings are "abortive 
under the Rules." Utah State· Emp·loy·ee's Credit Union v. Riding, 
24 Utah 2d 211, 469 P.2d 1 (1970). Thus, the pleading is without 
effect and did not act to stay the ten-day appeal period provided 
in Section 78-36-11. Even if this pleading had stayed the ten-
day period, Judge Sawaya affirmed the April 3, 1980 Judgment 
on April 23, 1980. So the ten-day appeal period would have run 
in any event on April 26, 1980. On May 5, 1980, thirty-two days 
after the unlawful detainer Judgment was entered, appellant BUFFO 
filed a Notice of Appeal. (R. 280-1). Section 78-36-11 spec-
ifically requires that an appeal from an unlawful detainer judg-
ment must be taken within ten days: "Either party may, within 
ten days, appeal from the judgment rendered." This shorter 
period for filing a Notice of Appeal implements the policy of I, 
the Unlawful Detainer Statute in Utah of accelerated resolution 
of disputed possession of real property. Since the ten-day appeal 
period had expired on April 14, 1980, (three weeks before BUFFO's 
appeal was filed}, this Court is without jurisdiction to hear 
the instant appeal, and it should be dismissed. 
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A. The Shorter Ten-Day Appeal Period Provided in 
78-36-11, Utah Code Annotated, Rather Than The 
General One Month Appeal Period Provided in 
Rule 73(a) I Utah Rules of civil Procedure 
Contr·o1s i'n This Case. 
BUFFO appealed from Judge Sawaya's April 3, 1980 un-
lawful Detainer Judgment on May 5, 1980. (R. 280-1). BUFFO 
must argue that the appeals procedure in the instant case is 
governed by Rule 73(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which 
provides for a one month period within which to file a Notice 
of Appeal. BUFFO's argument fails because Rule 73(a) creates 
a one-month period for appeal "unless a shorter time is provided 
by law." Section 78-36-11 unquestionably establishes such a 
"shorter time" in unlawful detainer cases. Specifically, the 
statute provides that: "(e)ither party may, within ten days, 
appeal from the judgment rendered." (emphasis added). 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently applied the 
ten-day limitation to unlawful detainer actions rather than the 
general one month provision for other appeals. Hunsaker v. 
Harris, 37 Utah 226, 109 P. 1 (1910). In Madsen v. Chournos, 
102 Utah 247, 129 P.2d 986 (1942), a landlord successfully brought 
an unlawful detainer action against her tenant. The landlord 
moved to dismiss the tenant's appeal "on the ground that the 
action is an unlawful detainer proceeding and that the appeal 
• • • was not taken within ten days as required by Section 
104-60-14, R.s.u., 1933" (at 986). (the predecessor statute 
to Section 78-36-11, U.C.A., 1953). This Court dismissed the 
appeal a£ter Madsen, holding that the appeal "should have been 
taken within the period 0£ ten days." (at 986). In the more Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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recent case of Coombs v. ·J·ohnson, 26 Utah 2d 8, 484 P. 2d 155 
(1971), this Court acknowledged that Section 78-36-11 specified 
a ten-day period in which to file for appeal for an unlawful 
.. 
detainer judgment. Since the tenant in· Coombs had not appealed 
within ten days, its appeal was dismissed by this Court. 
Appellant BUFFO could argue that the one month limit 
should apply because Judge Sawaya's Findings of Fact supporting 
the unlawful detainer Judgment reflect upon other issues, such 
as the existence of an alleged underlying lease. The Utah 
Supreme Court has explicitly rejected such an argument in a case 
remarkably similar to the instant case. In· Brandley v.· Lewis, 
97 Utah 217, 92 P.2d 338 (1939), a landlord obtained an unlawful 
detainer judgment. The tenant appealed, but not within ten days. 
When respondent/landlord filed a Motion to Dismiss the appeal, 
appellant argued that the ten-day period was not the applicable 
limitation period. Appellant tenant in Brandley reasoned that 
because the unlawful detainer judgment necessitated an inter-
pretation of underlying lease terms, the judgment involved issues 
other than unlawful detainer. The Supreme Court rejected the 
tenant's argument: 
To determine therefore whether defendant was in 
unlawful detainer the Court must determine the 
meaning and effect of the [lease terms] , but that 
does not change the action from one in unlawful 
detainer. It is merely deciding a question the 
decision of which is necessary in making a 
determination as to whether defendant is in unlaw-
ful detainer. (at 339-340). 
The Utah Supreme Court found that the ten-day limitation was 
applicable and dismissed the appeal. 
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Judge Sawaya's Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and the resulting Unlawful Detainer Judgment 
considered in light of the rule of Brandley establish that BUFFO's 
appeal procedure was gove~ned by 78-36-11 (ten days) rather than 
Rule 73(a) (one month). 
Appellant BUFFO could also argue that the Utah Supreme 
Court has not used the ten-day limitation period when the unlawful 
detainer judgment was coupled with a judgment for counterclaim 
liability or a declaratory judgment. Ottenheimer v. Mountain 
States Supply Co., 56 Utah 190, 188 P. 1117 (1920); Dunbar v. 
Hansen, 68 Utah 398, 250 P. 982 (1926). Of course, there is 
no such separate count in the case at bar: the unlawful detainer 
issues were severed from the plaintiff BUFFO's action for declara-
tory judgment by the trial court. Judge Sawaya's Memorandum 
Decision clearly establishes that the Judgment focused on un-
lawful detainer. Judge Sawaya's decision was prefaced by the 
statement: "On the issue of unlawful detainer, the Court finds 
from a preponderance of greater weight of the evidence as follows 
" (R. 203). Furthermore, the Judgment of April 3, 1980, 
is entitled "Judgment (Unlawful Detainer)". (R. 233-4). Since 
the Wllawful detainer judgment stands by itself, the ten-day 
limitation of 78-36-11, Utah Code Annotated controls. 
B. Failure to Timely File· a Notice of Appeal is a 
Jurisdicti·on·al ne·f·ect Requiring this -Court to 
Dismiss Buffo's Appeal. 
Utah and the federal courts follow the firmly held 
rule that a Notice of Appeal must be timely filed or the appellate 
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court is without jurisdiction to hear the appeal. This Court 
has upheld this requirement that a Notice of Appeal ~ be timely 
filed even when presented with assertions of substantial prejudice 
to the appellant or inadvertence or incompetence of counsel. 
Anderson v. Anderson, 3 Utah 2d 277, 282 P.2d 845 (1955); Galanis 
v. Moyes, 16 Utah 2d 181, 397 P.2d 988 (1965); Estate of Ratliff 
v. Conrad, 19 Utah 2d 346, 431 P.2d 571 (1967) f ·1n re Lynch's 
Estate, 123 Utah 57, 254 P.2d 454 (1953). 
Section 78-36-11, Utah Code Annotated, provides: 
"Either party may, w"ithi·n ten days, appeal from the judgment 
rendered." The Utah Supreme Court has strictly enforced the 
ten-day limitation period. In Coombs v. ·Johnson, 26 Utah 2d 
8, 484 P.2d 155 (1971), an appellant filed a Notice of Appeal 
from a July 1 judgment on July 15. The court held that the 
appeal was not timely, and that therefore the Supreme Court 
was without jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Justice Tuckett, 
for a unanimous Court, stated: "It is apparent that the appeal 
was not taken within the time prescribed by Section 78-36-11, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and this Court is without jurisdiction 
to entertain it." (at 155). 
In a more recent case, Fernandez v. Purdue, 30 Utah 
2d 389, 518 P.2d 684 (1974), an unlawful detainer jud910-ent was 
entered on April 3, 1973, and defendants filed their Notice of 
Appeal from that judgment on April 30, 1973. Chief Justice 
Callister held that: "This appeal was not taken within ten days, 
the time provided in Section 78-36-11, Utah Code Annotated, 
;I 
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1953. This Court is without jurisdiction to entertain the instant 
appeal. n (at 685) • 
. In another recent case, Vickery v. Kaiser, 556 P.2d 
502 (1976), a tenant appealed from an unlawful detainer judgment. 
This Court observed that the unlawful detainer statutes (and 
specifically 78-36-11) require that "an appeal must be taken 
within ten days from the judgment rendered" (emphasis added) 
(at 503). Justice Elliott, for a unanimous court, held that "the 
appeal in this matter was not taken within ten days after judg-
ment ••• thus, this Court did not acquire jurisdiction to 
determine the matters." (at 503). 
In the instant case, the Clerk of the Court entered 
Judge Sawaya's Unlawful Detainer Judgment in the Register of 
Actions on the 3rd day of April, 1980. (R. 233). Appellant BUFFO 
filed his Notice of Appeal on May 5, 1980. (R. 280-1). The 
Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this appeal since it was 
not filed "within ten days", the time provided in Section 78-36-11. 
C. Filing an Unauthorized "Objection to Judgment" Does 
Not Toll the Ten-Day Limitation . Period For Filing 
a Notice of Appeal in an Unlawful Detainer Action 
Appellant BUFFO may argue that the appeal period did 
not end on April 14, ten days after the April 3, 1980 date of entry 
of the Judgment, because he filed an "Objection to Judgment" on 
April 11, 1980. (R. 238-9). There is no such pleading or document 
entitled "Objection to Judgment" authorized or permitted by either 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or the Forcible Entry and 
Detainer statutes. Such a docmnent could not terminate or stay 
the running of the time for appeal. 
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Appellant BUFFO may try to argue that the "Objection 
to Judgment" was a motion made pursuant to Rules 50, 52, or 59, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, even though none of those rules 
or the relief authorized pursuant to them was mentioned in the 
Objection to Judgment. Motions filed pursuant to Rules 50, 52 
and 59 are, of course, the only means for tolling the time for 
appeal provided in Rule 73. 
There are two reasons why this potential argument by 
appellant BUFFO should be rejected. First, to appeal a judgment 
entered in a forcible entry and detainer action, the appellant 
must appeal pursuant to Section 78-36-11, not Rule 73. Section 
78-36-11 does not contain provisions analogous to Rules 50, 52 
or 59. Instead, in consonance with the other accelerated pro-
cedures authorized to obtain repossession of real property unlaw-
fully held, the only remedy from an adverse judgment is an appeal 
within ten days. BUFFO did not do that and cannot now be heard 
to argue that his inartful attempt to file a post-judgment motion, 
pursuant to the inapplicable Rule 73, stayed the time for filing 
an appeal under the proper statute, Section 78-36-11. 
Second, this Court has recently held that the pattern 
of regularity of procedure provided by the Rules of Civil Pro-
stions presented and the finality of actions. In Peay v. Peay, 
607 P.2d 841 {Utah 1980), the defendant filed an unauthorized 
"Motion for Reconsideration of Order Striking Petition and Motion 
for Relief from Final Judgment." Justice Hall stated: "It is 
important to note in this regard that a party cannot extend the 
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time for filing an appeal by simply filing a 'Motion for Rec-
onsideration of Order Striking Petition and Motion for Relief 
from Final Judgment.'" (at 843) 
BUFFO's unauthorized pleading is rendered ineffective 
by the rule announced in Utah State Employees' Credit Union 
!!. Riding, 24 Utah 2d 211, 469 P.2d l (1970): 
Under the record here, we are unaware of any such 
motion under our rules •••• We think the motion to 
reconsider the motion to vacate the judgment is 
abortive under the rules • • • . We conclude that the 
judgment of foreclosure, unappealed from, must stand 
absent any timely appeal. (at 3) 
The.Rules of Civil Procedure were carefully prepared 
to assure a "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every 
action." (Rule 1, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure). But the rules 
must be followed. Respondent INTERMOUNTAIN should not be forced 
to speculate as to the true or intended nature of appellant 
BUFFO's pleadings. The Supreme Court observed this principle 
in Drury v. Lunceford, 18 Utah 2d 74, 415 P.2d 662 (1966): " 
the new rules of procedure • • • were designed to provide 
a pattern of regularity of procedure which the parties and the 
courts could follow and rely upon •••• " (at 663). 
The reasoning in Peay, Riding and Drury is sound 
and controlling in the instant case. Appellant BUFFO's Ob-
jection to Judgment is "abortive under the rules" and therefore 
did not stay the time for filing the Notice of Appeal. 
Finally, even if the Objection to Judgment did toll 
the ten-day limitations period (as appellant BUFFO may contend), 
the May s, 1980 Notice of Appeal still was not timely filed. 
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After Judgment was entered on April 3, 1980, BUFFO filed his 
Objection to Judgment on April 11, 1980. The limitation period 
was running for that interval (eight days). If the Objection 
to Judgment did indeed toll the ten-day period on April 11, 
1980, it tolled that period only until April 23, 1980, (R. 254) 
when BUFFO's Objection was rejected by Judge Sawaya and Unlawful 
Detainer Judgment was reaffirmed. Another twelve days expired 
before the Notice of Appeal was filed. Thus, even if the 
limitation period were tolled during the consideration of the 
Objection to Judgment, the Notice of Appeal was not filed until 
May 5, 1980 - well after the expiration 0£ the ten-day period. 
II. THERE WAS NO VALID ASSIGNMENT OF INVESTESTATE'S 
LEASE TO UTE-CAL. · 
Appellant BUFFO proposes two ·theories to establish 
the existence of a valid lease between UTE-CAL and PETE J. 
BUFFO, as tenant, and INTERMOUNTAIN, as landlord. The first 
theory argues that the INVESTESTATE-Stan Adams lease of August 1, 
1976, was effectively assigned to UTE-CAL and PETE J. BUFFO. 
(Appellant BUFFO's Brief at 6). The purported assignment is 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 31). 
A. INVESTESTATE's Lease Was Terminated on October 13, 
1977. 
The trial court found that INVESTESTATE's lease was 
terminated on October 13, 1977 (Trial Court's Findings of Fact 
No. 4; R. 225-26; R. 335), long before the attempted assignment 
to UTE-CAL and PETE J. BUFFO in May of 1978. (R. 439-440). 
The October 13, 1977 Notice of Termination of the INVESTESTATE-
Stan Adams lease was admitted into evidence at trial as Defendant's 
Exhibit No. 2. Since the prior, INVESTES'Jr1';,(=·~-n~~on?~<'< ~-. 
/ 
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had been terminated on October 13, 1977, the trial court properly 
concluded, as a matter of law, that no valid assignment of 
the lease could have occurred. (Conclusions of Law No. l; R. 228). 
Appellant BUFFO cannot cite to any evidence in the Record to 
contradict the trial court's Findings of Fact No. 4 (R. 225) 
that the INVESTESTATE-Stan Adams lease was validly terminated 
in October, 1977, over six months before the purported assign-
ment to UTE-CAL and BUFFO. This finding of the trial court 
should therefore be sustained as there is no contradicting 
evidence much less evidence which preponderates against the 
trial court's Findings of Fact. Elton v. Utah State Retirement 
Board, 28 Utah 2d 368, 503 P.2d 137 (1972). 
B. Even if The LOwer court's Finding of the October '13, 
1977, Terminatio·n· is· Ove·rturned, No Valid Assignment 
of the INVESTESTATE Lease· Could Have Occurr·ed. 
The purported assignment of the INVESTESTATE-Stan Adams 
lease to UTE-CAL and PETE J. BUFFO was invalid because it violated 
the express terms of the lease. (Dee£endant's Exhibit No. 1, 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 31). Article VI, Section 4, of the 
lease precludes any assignment without the express written 
consent of the landlord, INTERMOUNTAIN. (Defendant's Exhibit 
No. 1). The record shows that INTERMOUNTAIN never gave such 
consent. (R. 335), and appellant BUFFO has not attempted to prove 
otherwise. Consequently, the May 1978 purported assignment 
by INVESTESTATE-Stan Adams to UTE-CAL and PETE J. BUFFO is 
in violation of the terms of the previously cancelled lease 
between INTERMOUNTAIN as landlord and INVESTESTATE-Stan Adams 
as tenant. The purported assignment transferred no rights to 
mm: as INVESTESTATE had none to transfer. 
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C. Even if· the TNVES'TESTA"TE Le·a·s·e· wa·s· Not "Terminated 
on· Octobe·r 13" I. -f977· I. Tt Exp':Lr·ea By Its• Own: 'Te'rtnS 
·o·n ·July ·3-i-, · "1"9 7 8 • 
The INVESTESTATE lease provided for a two-year term that 
ended on July 31, 1978 (Article II of Defendant's Exhibit No. 
1). The tenant (INVESTESTATE-Stan Admas) could have extended 
the lease for an additional five years by 9ivin9 written notice 
to the landlord INTERMOUNTAIN at least six months prior to the 
expiration of the lease (Article XVII of Defendant's Exhibit 
No. 1). However, the President of INVESTESTATE, Stan Adams, 
stated unequivocally at trial that he did not "exercise the 
option to extend that lease." (R. 391). 
An option to renew a lease must be exercised by the 
tenant in order to effectuate the renewal. · Aiken v. Less 
Taylor Motor· Co., 171 P.2d 676 (Utah 1946). In Utah, the notice 
to exercise a tenant's right to extend a lease must conform 
to the precise terms required by the lease agreement. ·I .X.L. 
Furniture & Carpet Insta1lation· Hou·se v. Berets et al., 91 P. 
279 (Utah 1907). If the renewal option terms are not complied 
with, equity cannot intervene to protect the tenant from its 
own failure to give the required notice of its option to renew 
the lease. Host International Inc. v. Summa Corp., 583 P.2d 
1080 (Nev. 1978). 
INTERMOUNTAIN, of course, never received any written 
notice of intent -to extend the lease from INVESTESTATE as none 
was ever sent. (R. 391). UTE-CAL and PETE J. BUFFO could not 
have extended the INVESTESTATE-Stan Adams lease because notice 
to landlord INTERMOUNTAIN had to be given at least six months 
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prior to the expiration of the lease. (Defendant's Exhibit 
No. 1). The lease expired on July 31, 1978, and therefore any 
notice of intent to extend would have to have occurred by 
January 30, 1978. (Defendant's Exhibit No. 1). However, it 
was not until May, 1978, four months after the notice date, 
that UTE-CAL and PETE J. BUFFO attempted an assumption of the 
lease. (Defendant's Exhibit No. 1, R. 439-440, Appellant BUFFO's 
Brief, Page 3). Consequently, the final date for extending 
the lease had expired before UTE-CAL and PETE J. BUFFO even 
attempted to extend the original term of the INVESTESTATE-Stan 
Adams lease. (Defendant's Exhibit No. 1, Appellant BUFFO's 
Brief, Page 7). Therefore, even if the lease continued in 
existence after the October 13, 1977 Notice of Termination 
(Defendant's Exhibit No. 2) the lease expired by its own terms 
on July 31, 1978 and could not have been extended in May, 1978. 
(Defendant's Exhibit No. 1). 
III. INTERMOUNTAIN AS LANDLORD AND UTE-CAL AND PETE J. 
BUFFO AS TENANT NEVER AGREED UPON LEASE TERMS. 
Appellant BUFFO's second theory is that a valid lease 
was created by a set of negotiations which occurred between 
INTERMOUNTAIN and UTE-CAL from June to August, 1978. 
Appellant BUFFO does not argue that a written lease 
agreement exists. The testimony of INTERMOUNTAIN's President, 
Reo Cutler, (R. 348, 353) and that of PETE J. BUFFO (R. 459) 
confirm that there never was a written lease agreement acceptable 
to and signed by both parties. The absence of any written 
agreement between the parties creates a fatal statute of fraud 
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problem for the appellant BUFFO: Utah law provides that any 
lease for a term longer than one year is unenforceable unless 
reduced to a signed writing. Section 25-5-3, U.C.A. Further-
more, the trial court found, based upon two days of testimony 
by eleven witnesses and thirty-one exhibits, that no recognized 
exception to the statute of frauds had been established by 
UTE-CAL and PETE J. BUFFO. (Trial Court Conclusion of Law No. 4; 
R. 229). 
Appellant BUFFO must argue that the statute of frauds 
does not bar his claims. Appellant BUFFO addresses the issue 
of whether an exception to the statute of frauds applies, 
(Appellant BUFFO's Brief at Page 8) but, in so doing, appellant 
BUFFO has overlooked a prior question. Before the statute of 
frauds becomes relevant, appellant must establish that there 
was in fact, a contract, which was not reduced to a signed 
writing. BUFFO, at trial, could not establish the existence 
of an underlying contract. The parties were far apart on all 
terms, including rent, term and the consequences of a sale of 
the building. (Defendant's Exhibit Nos. 5, 8 and 16; R. 453) 
Since there was no contract, or meeting of the minds, the Court 
needn't address the question of whether it should be in writing. 
Skeen v. Van· Sickle, 15 P.2d 344 (Utah 1932). In Skeen, the 
heirs of a landowner alleged the existence of a contract wherein· 
the landowner had agreed that her land would revert to all her 
heirs as tenants in conunon. The defendants raised the statute 
of frauds as a defense. The court found that the statute of 
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frauds was irrelevant because the plaintiffs had failed to prove 
the extence of the underlying contract: •The finding of no 
contract at all eliminates any question as to a requirement 
that it should be in writing •••• • (at 346). 
A. There Was No Unde·r·lying· 'Contra·ct Which Would 
Make The Statute oCFrauds a· Relevant Consideration. 
The trial court reached the legal conclusion that no 
written lease was signed by the parties (Trial Court Conclusion 
of Law No. l; R. 228; R. 352-3). No signed lease was offered 
at trial and both INTERMOUNTAIN's President (R. 348, 397 and 399) 
and PETE J. BUFFO confirmed that no such lease was ever signed. 
(R. 459). Consequently, the appellants claim to find the 
requisite underlying contract in the unsigned, draft agreement 
which UTE-CAL and PETE J. BUFFO's counsel, Loni F. DeLand sent 
to INTERMOUNTAIN's counsel, Jon c. Heaton on August 1, 1978. 
(Defendant's Exhibit No. 5). Appellant BUFFO now asks that 
this "negotiated lease" be enforced as an exception to the 
statute of frauds (Appellant's Brief, Page 8). 
The August 1, 1978 proposed lease was prepared by 
counsel to UTE-CAL and PETE J. BUFFO, (R. 384-386, 452) but 
it cannot be construed as the necessary underlying contract. 
The trial court found that INTERMOUNTAIN rejected, in writing, 
the terms of that proposed lease and sent a counterproposal 
to BUFFO's counsel. (Findings of Fact No. 11; R. 227; R. 345-6; 
R. 384-6). Neither party's proposal was accepted by the other 
party (Court's Findings of Fact No. 11; R. 227, R. 346, 348, 
459). Since the parties' proposals differed substantially 
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(Defendant's Exhibit No. 8) no meeting of the minds has occurred 
(Trial Court's Conclusion of Law No. 21 R. 228-29). 
Since no contract was ever agreed upon by the parties, 
the Court need not address the question of whether the contract 
had to be in writing. The statute of frauds simply doesn't 
apply. 
B. · Even If a con·tr·act Exi·ste·d', It Ts· Within The Statute 
of Frauds To Which Tfie·r·e Ts No Applicable Ex·ception. 
If any contract existed, as appellant BUFFO argues, 
it was a lease for a period of longer than one year and, thus, 
within the statute of frauds, Section 25-5-3, u.c.A. The trial 
court reached the legal conclusion that "UTE-CAL and/or BUFFO have 
failed to establish any recognized exception to the statute of 
frauds" (Conclusion of Law No. 4; R. 229). In an attempt to have 
this Court overturn that decision, appellant BUFFO argues that 
the parties' actions might establish three exceptions to the statute 
of frauds: part performance, equitable estoppel, or waiver. The 
decisions of this Court, however, hold that none of these possible 
exceptions is applicable to the facts of the instant case. 
1. Part ·Performa·nce. In· Ravarino v. Price, 2 6 O P. 2d 
570 (Utah 1953), this Court recognized the "part performance" 
exception to the statute of frauds. The Court outlined the 
circumstances under which part performance would obtain: acts 
will constitute sufficient part performance if they are clearly 
referable to some contract existing between the parties, if they 
relate to the subject matter in dispute and as a result of these 
acts, the plaintiff has been defrauded. Such circumstances are 
not evident in the case at bar: appellant BUFFO has failed to 
/~ 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
prove the existence of any underlying contract, (Trial court's 
lindings of Fact No. 11; R. 227; Defendant's Exhibit No. 8) and 
no fraud has been alleged by either party. To establish the part 
perfonnance exception to the statute of frauds, BUFFO and/or 
UTE-CAL would have had to demonstrate that their part performance 
claim was referable only to the alleqed oral lease. Price v. 
Lloyd, 86 P. 767 (Utah 1906). The acts performed by BUFFO and/or 
UTE-CAL - possession and periodic late payment of rent - are not 
referable only to the alleged oral lease, but rather are entirely 
consistent with a month-to-month tenancy existing between INTER-
MOUNTAIN and BUFFO and/or UTE-CAL. 
Appellant BUFFO cites Adams v. Taylor, 391 P.2d 837 
(Utah 1964) in support if its "part performance" argument. In 
Adams, tenants made extensive improvements, timely paid monthly 
rent for two years in reliance upon an oral contract to lease 
the premises for five yearsJ more importantly, tenants had a 
memorandmn signed by the landlord evidencing their agreement. 
There is no such written agreement in this case, and the trial 
court expressly found that BUFFO had failed to prove any contract 
other than a month-to-month tenancy. (Trial Court's Findings of 
Fact No. 11; R. 227; Conclusions of Law No. 2; R. 228-29).-
Consequently the "actions" by BUFFO, including late rent payments 
made by UTE-CAL and BUFFO merely confirm the existence of a month-
to-month tenancy rather than any lease. 
2. Esto·ppel. Appellant BUFFO next argues that respondent 
INTERMOUNTAIN is estopped from asserting the statute of frauds 
as a defense. (Appellant's Brief at 9). Appellant BUFFO bases 
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its estoppel argument on two allegations wholly unsupported by 
evidence at trial. The first unsupported assertion is that INTER-
MOUNTAIN represented "that it (UTE-CAL) would acquire the real 
property lease • • • 11 (Appellant's Brief, Page 9) while the second 
unsupported assertion is that INTERMOUNTAIN (through its President 
Reo Cutler) told appellant BUFFO that it was "Okay to expend 
the monies on the premises" (Appellant's Brief at Page 10). 
These allegations, however, are contrary to the facts established 
at trial and the Trial Court's Conclusion of Law No. 6 {R. 226): 
that the improvements made by UTE-CAL and BUFFO "were made prior 
to lease negotiations between INTERMOUNTAIN and BUFFO and/or 
UTE-CAL and after INTERMOUNTAIN 1 s warning to BUFFO not to make 
such improvements until a written lease agreement was entered 
into by the parties." (R. 230-31). The evidence supporting the 
trial court's finding is Reo Cutler•· s testimony, as President 
of INTERMOUNTAIN, that he specifically warned PETE J. BUFFO not 
to make improvements without a lease {R. 337,358) and the 
improvements were made in June, 1978, while draft leases were 
not exchanged until August, 1978. 
This Court recently emphasised that the trial court 
has the responsibility of determining disputed issues of fact 
and in so doing, the fact finder will "necessarily accept the 
testimony of certain witnesses, discounting conflicting testimony. 
We do not. substitute our belief for theirs unless there is no 
competent evidence to support the verdict." Fillmore Pr·oducts 
· v.· Weste·rn States Paving, 592 P.2d 581, 582 (Utah 1979). The 
trial court believed the testimony of Cutler and discoWlted the 
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testimony of the felon PETE J. BUFFO. Because there is competent 
evidence to support this finding by the trial court, this court 
should not substitute its assessment of transcript testimony for 
the trial court's appraisal of these two witnesses' credibility. 
Furthermore, even if INTERMOUNTAIN did promise to enter 
into a lease with BUFFO or UTE-CAL, such an oral promise does 
not estop INTERMOUNTAIN from interposing the statute of frauds 
as a defense. In Ravar'ino 'V. p·rice, 260 P.2d 570 (Utah 1953), 
the Utah Supreme Court relied upon the long recognized rule laid 
down by the United States Supreme Court in Union Mutual Life 
Insurance Co. v. Mowry, 96 U.S. 544 (1878) regarding estoppel 
in the context of a promise to perform in the future: "The only 
case in which a representation as to the future can be held to 
operate as an estoppel is where it relates to an intended abandon-
ment of an existing riqht, and is made to influence others, and 
by which they have been induced to act •••• " (at 547). 
In Ravarino, supra this Court provided an example of 
such an abandonment of a legal right. This Court cited Waugh 
v. Lennard, 211 P.2d 806 (Ariz. 1949), where the defendant induced 
the plaintiff to refrain from commencing an action on a promissory 
note by representing that he would not invoke the statute of 
limitations as a bar. In a subsequent action, the defenant did 
attempt to raise the statute as a bar. The Arizona court held 
that he was estopped from doing so: by his promise, the defendant 
had manifested an intent to abandon an existing right. 
Appellant BUFFO's Brief does not suggest that any existing 
right was abandoned by INTERMOUNTAIN. Instead, appellant BUFFO 
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alleges, again without citation to any supporting evidence, that 
INTERMOUNTAIN represented that a lease would be executed at 
some time in the future (Appellant BUFFO's Brief, Page 9). Not 
only is such an allegation contrary to the evidence (Trial Court's 
Conclusion of Law ~o. 6; R. 230, 337), it is insufficient under 
the Ravarino test to estop INTERMOUNTAIN from asserting the 
statute of frauds. 
INTERMOUNTAIN made no such pro~ase which could func-
tion as an abandonment of an existing right (Trial Court's 
Conclusion of Law No. 5; R. 229-30). Any improvements to 
the property were made in spite of the warnings by INTERMOUNTAIN's 
President. 
Appellant BUFFO's equitable estoppel argument is 
further weakened by the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Easton 
v. Wycoff, 295 P.2d 332 (Utah 1956). In Easton, the Court 
addressed the question of whether the reliance of the tenant 
upon the promise of the landlord to execute the written lease 
in the future would estop the landlord from asserting the 
statute of frauds as a defense. The Court applied the rule 
set forth in Ravarino, supra, that a mere refusal to execute 
a written contract as agreed, does not constitute fraud suf-
ficient to remove the oral promise from the statute of frauds. 
The court emphasized that: "[The] mere promise to execute 
a written contract, followed by refusal to do so, is not suf-
ficient to create an estoppel, even though reliance is placed 
on such promise and damages occasioned by such refusal." (at 
335). 
/ 
\: 
I= 
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Ravarino and Easton hold that, even if INTERMOUNTAIN 
promised to execute a lease with UTE-CAL (a promise which 
the trial court concluded had never been made), such a promise 
does not estop INTERMOUNTAIN from raising the statute of frauds 
as a defense. 
3. Wai·ver. Appellant BUFFO' s final argument on 
the statute of frauds issue alleges that respondent INTERMOUNTAIN 
"Waived their right to execution of their lease." (Appellant's 
Brief at 11). Appellant BUFFO's entire argument is based 
upon an isolated case from a foreign jurisdiction. In that 
case, McKennon v. Anderson, 298 P.2d 492 (Wash. 1956), a tenant 
made improvements after the parties had agreed upon the terms 
of the lease. The Washington Supreme Court held that since 
a written contract existed, the lack of formalities did not 
defeat the validity of that contract. The landlord was not 
allowed to assert the lack of formalities as a defense to 
the existence of the lease. McKennon is neither controlling 
nor particularly persuasive: unlike the tenant in McKennon, 
UTE-CAL and BUFFO have failed to prove any underlying contract, 
either formal or informal. In McKennon, an offer and acceptance 
of the terms had occurred. Instead of a question of the com-
pliance with certain formalities of execution, in the instant 
case, there is no evidence whatsoever of any agreement and the 
trial court properly so found. 
IV. BUFFO AND UTE-CAL WERE VALIDLY SERVED UNDER 
78-36-6, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED. 
Appellant BUFFO next attacks the trial court's 
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his personal corporation, UTE-CAL, were duly and properly served 
with the Notice to Quit on December 12, 1979 (Trial Court's 
Findings of Fact No. 8; R. 231). 
Section 78-36-3(2), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, governs 
when a month-to-month tenant is in unlawful detainer. Appellant 
BUFFO seeks to avoid this statute by announcing that it was not 
a month-to-month tenant: "Since UTE-CAL is asserting a lease 
with a definite period, it does not fall under 78-36-3(2)." 
(Appellant's Brief at 12). But this bald assertion was rejected 
by the trial court and BUFFO does not cite in its Brief any 
conflicting evidence admitted at trial. (Trial Court's Finding 
of Fact No. 13; R. 227-28; Trial Court's Conclusion of Law No. 
7; R. 231). The trial court found that the absence of a lease 
between INTERMOUNTAIN and UTE-CAL and/or BUFFO established a 
month-to-month tenancy. (Findings of Fact No. 13; R. 227-8). 
Therefore, 78-36-3(2) Utah Code Annotated, 1953, governs the 
form of the Notice to Quit in the instant case. Defendant's 
Exhibit No. 20 - the December 11, 1979 Notice to Quit was in 
the proper form to terminate the month-to-month tenancy. (Findings j: 
of Fact No. 16; R. 228). f1 
Appellant BUFFO next argues that service of the Notice 
to Quit was inadequate. (Appellant's Brief at 11) for failure 
to comply with Section 78-36-6. The Court should reject this I:: 
argument as appellant BUFFO in his January 22, 1980 Answer to 
Defendant's (INTERMOUNTAIN) Counterclaim at paragraph 10 (R. 
49-50) "admit(s) service." At trial counsel for BUFFO sought 
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to avoid that admission (R. 403-05) but did not move to amend 
the answer and the trial court found that on "December 12, 1979, 
Exchange_Associates caused a Notice to Quit to be served upon 
UTE-CAL and BUFFO, which Notice required UTE-CAL and BUFFO to 
quit the premises on or before the last day of December, 1979." 
(R. 228). 
In addition, appellant BUFFO at trial stipulated, 
through his counsel that the Constable "served a copy of this 
notice ••• in accordance with his affidavit." (R.f103-04). 
Defendant's Exhibit 20 is the Constable's Affidavit of Service 
and he swears that on December 12, 1979, he •posted on door 
and mailed a copy to each at the usual place of business.of said 
defendants." 
Therefore, Section 78-36-6 was precisely complied 
with as to both UTE-CAL and BUFFO since copies of the Notice 
to Quit were posted on the door ·and mailed. Perkins v. Spencer, 
243 P.2d 446, 451 (Utah 1952). 
Appellant BUFFO next argues that Rule 4 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procecure overrides the specific service require-
ments of Section 78-36-6. Appellant BUFFO neither cites any 
authority for this proposition nor offers any particularly good 
reason why the carefully drafted unlawful detainer statute 
service provisions should be modified by a cross-reference to 
Rule 4, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
-29-
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V. THE AWARD OF DAMAGES BY THE LOWER COURT SHOULD 
BE AFFIRMED 
A. Judge Sawaya· Prop·e·rlt Aw-a·rd·ea 'l'"rebTe n·a.ma·g·e·s· ·1n 
· This· un1·awu:l Detaine·r Action 
Section 78-36-10, Utah Code Annotated, provides for 
treble damages in unlawful detainer actions. Appellant BUFFO 
now seeks to overturn the trial court's award of treble damages. 
This Court's decisions establish that treble damages 
should be awarded in unlawful detainer actions. In Forrester v. 
Cook, 292 P. 206 (Utah 1930), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
"The statute [i.e. an earlier statute which provides as does 
78-36-10, that if the court assessed damages occasioned to the 
plaintiff by any unlawful detainer, the judgment should be rendered 
against defendant for three times the amount of damages assessed] 
makes it mandatory upon the court to render judgment for 
three times the amount of damages thus assessed." (at 214). 
Appellant BUFFO relies on Price Construction Co. 
V. Foutz, __ P.2d __ (Utah Supreme Court, May 30, 1980) 
{No. 16688), a recent case in which the Utah Supreme Court did 
not award treble damages in an unlawful detainer action. In 
a very brief opinion, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed a trial 
court's decision in which treble damages were not awarded. 
However, it is not established that the plaintiff in Price 
even sought treble damages at the trial level. Section 78-36-10 
is not even mentioned in the opinion and this Court did not 
address the issue of treble damages. It would be difficult 
to conclude that this Court in ·Price did intend to overturn 
the well-established Utah rule regarding treble damages in 
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unlawful detainer actions since the Court annoWlced that "this 
opinion does not add significantly to existing law and hence 
is not to be published •••• " Whether an Wlpublished opinion 
should even be cited as authority overruling an unchallenged 
fifty-year old rule is unclear at best. 
B. BUFFO is Personally Liable. 
In its Brief, plaintiff/appellant declares that 
"third-party defendant/appellant seeks to be declared not 
personally responsible for damages. (Third-party defendant/ 
appellant was not explicitly found personally liable and argues 
that he is not)." (Appellant BUFFO's Brief at 2). 
BUFFO ignores the express conclusion of the trial 
court finding him personally liable. In Conclusion of Law No. 
9, Judge Sawaya explicitly found that "treble damages shall 
be three times $936 per month • • • for each month or a portion 
thereof which BUFFO and/or UTE-CAL unlawfully detained the 
premises known as the Exchange Club. Furthermore, BUFFO and/or 
UTE-CAL are also liable £or rent for the months of April, 1979, 
and December, 1979 •••• " (R. 231) Similarly the Judgment 
(Unlawful Detainer) also expressly provides that "defendants 
and third-party plaintiffs (INTERMOUNTAIN) have and recover 
from plaintiff (UTE-CAL) and the third-party defendant (PETE 
J. BUFFO) jointly and severally, the sum of $13,688.00, which 
includes treble damages •••• " (R. 233-34). 
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. CONCLUSTON 
Judge Sawaya correctly determined that BUFFO and/or 
UTE-CAL could not have acquired a valid assignment of the 
tenninated INVESTESTATE lease. BUFFO also failed to establish 
any new lease agreement between UTE-CAL and/or BUFFO and 
INTERMOUNTAIN. Since the Notice to Quit was properly served 
upon UTE-CAL and BUFFO on December 12, 1979, both UTE-CAL and 
BUFFO remained in unlawful detainer of the premises after 
December 31, 1979. Hence, felon PETE J. BUFFO was properly 
determined to be personally liable for treble damages. 
The Unlawful Detainer Judgment, supported by detailed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law after two days of trial 
before Judge Sawaya, should be affirmed. 
DATED this !~day of October, 1980. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
BY: 
Gordon Strachan 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Third Party Plaintiffs 
INTERMOUNTAIN 
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DeLand, McRae and DeLand, 72 East 400 South, 1355, Salt Lake 
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City, Utah 84111 this "2__ day of October, 1980. 
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